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indebtedness of the household are crucial factors in the performance of the loan. We also show that 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis starting in 2007 changed the environment of banking systems 
profoundly, and this did not leave the Hungarian financial intermediary system 
unscathed. The banking sector responded to the crisis by substantial balance sheet 
deleveraging, while non-performing portfolios rose to record heights. Despite 
government measures and banks’ efforts, nearly a fifth of the entire household 
loan portfolio was non-performing at the end of 2013.1 This level is extremely 
high in regional comparison, even if one-off factors such as the early repayment 
scheme also increased it. 
Relying on micro data, our research was primarily focused on exploring the 
macro, socio-demographic, and loan characteristic variables that account for the 
probability of default (PD) in the case of household mortgage loans. To that end, 
we applied binary estimation methods, mainly logit models, as modelling tools. 
A key task of our exercise was to examine the relationship between the payment-
to-income ratio (PTI) and credit risks. In this framework, we attempted to identify 
the maximum PTI level at which the overindebtedness of households may be still 
avoided. The latter is not only important from the perspective of households, but 
may also be a crucial factor for financial stability considerations. Thus, besides 
serving ground-breaking analytical purposes, our research may provide a suffi-
cient foundation for regulatory authorities to develop measures for preventing the 
build-up of macroprudential risks.
Our study is structured as follows: after the introduction, we provide an over-
view of the relevant Hungarian and international literature, primarily from the 
aspect of default. This is followed by the presentation of data used for the pur-
poses of our study and, since a sampling technique is applied in our micro data-
base analysis, we also assess the representativity of our sample (relative to macro 
data). The next section includes a detailed description of our model specification, 
the results gleaned from the estimation, and a robustness analysis. A separate 
section is devoted to variables that were excluded from our estimate despite their 
potential impact on the probability of default, as confirmed by empirical observa-
tions. We also offer an explanation for their exclusion. In the last part of our pa-
per, we discuss the relationship between the payment-to-income ratio and credit 
risks before providing a summary of our most important conclusions.
1  The non-performing ratio remained very high (19.2%) at the end of 2014.
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2. RELEVANT LITERATURE
The most important feature of Hungarian mortgage loans to households is its 
denomination structure, given that at the beginning of the crisis, 70% of the loan 
portfolio was denominated in foreign currency, especially in Swiss francs. The 
reasons for the emergence of foreign currency lending to households have been 
discussed extensively both in the Hungarian and in the international literature 
(e.g. Zettelmeyer et al. 2010; Bethlendi 2011; Király – Banai 2012; Hudecz 
2013). Basso et al. (2007) established that, among other factors, an easy access 
to foreign currency financing, large interest rate differentials between domestic 
and foreign currencies, and the openness of economies all shifted households’ 
focus to foreign currency borrowing. All these factors were prominently present 
in Hungary at the time. During the crisis, the HUF exchange rate depreciated 
considerably against the Swiss franc and, consequently, the performance of the 
substantial retail FX loan portfolio deteriorated substantially.
Hosszú (2011) concluded that the open exchange rate position of households 
played a role in the default of retail loans. The paper relies on the cross-sectional 
micro database of the Household Budget Survey (HBS) compiled by the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO) for the period of 2004–2008 for analysing the consump-
tion patterns and borrowing decisions of households and the heterogeneity of these 
decisions in various income brackets. It draws conclusions based on the indebted-
ness and labour market position of households, identifying the macroeconomic 
factors that may have played an important role in the non-performance of certain 
income strata. According to this database, after the outbreak of the crisis, even a 
slight strengthening of the Swiss franc exchange rate may have resulted in debt-
re payment problems in the low-income strata owing to high instalment amounts 
relative to income, whereas in the case of the medium-income strata, the increase 
in the ratio of non-performing loans may have been caused primarily by the loss 
of employment. The greatest disadvantage of the HBS survey compared to that 
used in this paper is that it offers far less information about the loans granted to 
households.2 
Gáspár – Varga (2011) also used the HBS micro database for modelling the re-
payment problems. They assume that a household cannot perform its repayment 
obligation if its monthly instalment exceeds 40% of its net income (as the remain-
ing 60% should cover basic consumption expenditures). The authors attributed 
2  The HBS introduced the question set related to household loans only in 2010. At the same 
time, even the surveys compiled in subsequent years do not include data on restructuring or 
the exchange rate cap. Moreover, regarding the NPL ratio of the banking sector, the HBS data 
are not representative.
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the resulting default to three factors: the initial level of indebtedness (PTI) was 
already too high; depreciation of the HUF exchange rate; loss of employment. 
Based on their findings, high initial indebtedness and exchange rate changes were 
responsible for 50% and 45% of defaults, respectively, while unemployment ac-
counted for the remaining, almost negligible percentage. Once again, the use of 
the HBS implied a disadvantage due to its restricted and non-representative in-
formation base on loans (for instance, based on HBS data, the household loan 
portfolio is far smaller than the actual outstanding debt of the sector).
Holló (2009) used the panel database of three commercial banks with substan-
tial households’ exposure. The applied method in this case was survival analysis, 
which takes into account that the probability of default is varied in different life 
cycles of the loan. His findings suggest that the loans’ denomination structure, 
the initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and the debtor’s level of education can be 
considered as the main customer- and product-specific drivers of default risk, 
while the unemployment rate, domestic and foreign interest rates as well as the 
exchange rate constitute the major macro-risk factors impacting defaults.3
Holló – Papp (2007) is another noteworthy study in the Hungarian literature. 
The authors set out to model the probability of default by using financial margin 
calculations, logit, and neural network approaches. According to their findings, 
disposable income, the number of dependants, the share of monthly debt servicing 
costs, and the employment status of the head of the household have meaningful 
explanatory power. The resultant models were used to test the shock-absorbing 
capacity of the banking system. Although this is the earliest among those quoted 
and hence its conclusions are the farthest from those presented in this analysis, 
this was the MNB’s last household survey comparable to this one. The most im-
portant difference between the two surveys lies in the scopes of questions asked 
since those have been extended in this study. The 2013 survey introduced ques-
tions about the value of all real estate owned by the household, not only those 
used as collaterals. Similarly, questions were included in this survey about a pos-
sible restructuring and its date, participation in the exchange rate cap and the 
early repayment scheme, and the involvement of a lending intermediary. 
The results of the relevant Hungarian literature, so far, can be summed up as 
follows: both Hosszú (2011) and Gáspár – Varga (2011) attribute the default of 
household loans to three main factors: initial debt overhang, loss of employment, 
and the change in the monthly instalment amount. The former merely attempted 
to explain which factor affected which income bracket the most, while the latter 
3  Ultimately, the model received was used for stress testing purposes. Its enhanced version is 
still used in the MNB’s solvency stress tests in order to calculate households’ default prob-
abilities (the actual model is described in Banai et al. 2013).
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decomposed and quantified the role of each element in households’ non-perform-
ance. Since, according to the former paper, excessive indebtedness was most typi-
cal in the low income brackets, and the latter pointed out that debt overhang was 
the most important factor leading to default, low-income households are presum-
ably over-represented within defaulting households. Similarly, the estimates of 
Holló – Papp (2007) and Holló (2009) reconfirm that all three factors (debt over-
hang, unemployment, and instalment increases) play a role in changes in the prob-
ability of default: debt overhang is measured (directly or indirectly) by the LTV, 
households’ disposable income, the payment-to-income ratio, and the number of 
dependants. The customer’s level of education and the labour market position of 
the head of the household are indicators of the probability of unemployment. 
Our analysis goes beyond the limits of previous Hungarian studies in several 
respects. On the one hand, it distinguishes between various product types and 
provides information about the features of loans disbursed in different years. On 
the other hand, based on the model, it draws relevant conclusions from a regula-
tory perspective as well.
The performance of household loans is also a common topic in the foreign liter-
ature. Blanco – Gimeno (2012) – based on the data of the Spanish credit register – 
has shown that the dynamics of non-performing loans was explained mostly by 
unemployment, credit stock, and a composite measure on instalment burden and 
revenue. Lydon – McCarthy (2013) examined the Irish mortgage market. Their 
results were intuitive since default was explained best by debt service burden and 
LTV. In addition, labour market position and the purpose of the mortgage (i.e. 
investment or self-use) were also significant explanatory vari ables. Mian – Sufi 
(2011) focused on the mortgage crisis of the US. They found that the probability 
of default increased most in those places where the swing in house prices was the 
biggest. In other words, the changing value of the collateral behind the loan influ-
ences significantly the probability of repayment.
There are also some examples where default probability was estimated from 
household surveys, by using binary choice models. May – Tudela (2005) esti-
mated a dynamic probit model for the probability of British households. The 
same households were interviewed each year; therefore, they had an opportunity 
to look at the impact of individual factors dynamically. They found that of all the 
variables under review, becoming unemployed had the largest marginal effect 
upon the probability of mortgage payment problems. In addition, interest income 
gearing also had a pronounced effect (interest payments and principal payments 
relative to income were examined separately). According to the authors, having 
unsecured debt and this being a heavy burden on the household significantly in-
creased the probability of having mortgage payment problems. Overall, the abil-
ity to repay was equally determined by labour market position and the size of the 
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instalment amount (which depends on indebtedness); in other words, the findings 
were consistent with those found on Hungarian data.
Finally, La Cava – Simon (2003) drew on data from a household survey to 
explore variables influencing the performance of loans. For our purposes, it is 
of special importance that the sample used for the logit model estimated by the 
authors included, similarly to ours, cross-sectional information only. The study 
was not focused exclusively on the performance of loans, but on the financial 
difficulties households faced in general. The authors wanted to find out which 
characteristics increased the probability of a household being financially con-
strained during the time of their review (at the turn of 1998/99). According to 
their analysis, a broad range of variables proved to be significant. Besides such 
variables as unemployment, the size of mortgage repayment, interest payable on 
credit card debt and income, certain one-off debtor characteristics such as age or 
household size also had a significant explanatory power. In sum, the international 
literature reveals that binary variable models have been used on several occasions 
to assess the financial performance of households. In these models, income and 
labour market position and the level of indebtedness had significant explanatory 
power in the assessment of households’ performance.
3. THE DATA 
In August 2013, the central bank of Hungary (MNB) collected information about 
indebted households via a questionnaire-based survey. The purpose of the survey 
was to enable the MNB to gain in-depth information about the financial position, 
level of indebtedness, and saving habits of households. The survey prepared with 
the assistance of GfK Hungária Market Research Institute involved households 
where at least one family member had some kind of a loan. The 1,000 households 
interviewed had a total of 1,322 loan contracts. Of all loan contracts, housing 
loans had the largest share in terms of number, with 341 such loans in the sam-
ple. Personal loans (196), overdrafts (176), home equity loans (163), and vehicle 
loans (138) also had a significant share. The number of student loans (28) and 
card-based credits (83) was relatively low. The ratio of product types to the total 
portfolio is nearly identical with the data seen in the banking sector.
It was an important objective of the survey to be representative in several 
regards: on the one hand, it had to represent households with outstanding loans 
according to a few important socio-demographical characteristics (such as house-
hold composition or the settlement type of the household’s residence). On the oth-
er hand, the survey had to ensure that the value of specific products in proportion 
to the total portfolio should correspond to that seen in the banking sector. Since 
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we have no information on the distribution of indebted households according to 
social attributes, the results of the survey can only be compared to the distribution 
of all households. Although this comparison may therefore show some differenc-
es, it can still be used as a point of reference. For example, 201 respondents of the 
1,000 interviewed were reported to live in Budapest, which roughly corresponds 
to the ratio of Budapest citizens to the total population, i.e. 18%. 251 respondents 
were reported to live in a county seat, which slightly exceeded the actual 20% ra-
tio. The 37% ratio of other towns is also somewhat higher than the actual 30% 
national ratio. Thus, taken together, the ratio received for debtors living in smaller 
municipalities was smaller than the 30% ratio to total households. 
The denomination of loans outstanding is a key question in the case of house-
hold loans, given that one of the most important risks of the portfolio stems from 
this feature. With that in mind, we examined the extent to which the currency 
composition received during the survey corresponded to banking sector data. 
With one exception, we did not find any significant differences. It was only in the 
case of housing loans that CHF- and JPY-denominated loans comprised a larger 
part of the sample than in reality. Consequently, HUF loans were under-repre-
sented. In the case of other product categories, we did not discern any significant 
differences and we can state that, overall, our sample is adequate even from the 
aspect of currency composition.
Table 1
Distribution of selected credit products by their denomination, 2013
Survey (%) Banking system – actual (%)
Denomi-
nation
Housing
loans
Home 
equity 
loans*
Vehicle
loans
Personal 
loans
Denomi-
nation
Housing
loans
Home 
equity 
loans*
Vehicle
loans
Personal 
loans
HUF 30 11 26 87 HUF 45 18 32 81
EUR 7 11 3 1 EUR 7 9 2 2
CHF 60 78 70 12 CHF and 
others 48 73 66 17JPY 3 0 0 0
Source: MNB and our survey. 
* General purpose loans collaterised with real estate.
Finally, we compared our sample to the banking sector data in respect of de-
linquency as well. This is a particularly important aspect, as the primary goal 
of our analysis is to explore the reasons for the non-performance of household 
loans. Regarding delinquency, we were focusing only on mortgage loans since 
our analysis was dealing only with their performance. Loans overdue more than 
90 days deserve special attention because they are considered non-performing 
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loans. Based on this definition, of all products under review, banking sector data 
and data from the survey were nearly the same. The difference between them 
amounted to 1 percentage point and 2 percentage points, respectively.
Table 2
Distribution of various credit products 
Delinquency 
(%)
Survey Banking system - actual
Housing loans Home equity loans* Housing loans
Home equity 
loans*
Performing 67 51 75 53
Less than 1 month 8 6 9 12
Between 1–3 months 10 13 4 7
More than 3 months 14 30 13 28
Source: MNB and the survey. 
* General purpose loans collaterised with real estate.
4. MODELLING OF DEFAULT PROBABILITY4
4.1. Structure of the model
As the data of the survey are representative, they are suitable both for analysing 
household loans and for modelling purposes, although it is important to add that 
due to the early repayment scheme in 2011, the portfolio quality in the banking 
system (as of mid-2014) was somewhat worse than the originally issued port-
folio, because most of the households using the early repayment scheme were 
better performing debtors. With our estimates we intended to find out which fac-
tors play a relevant role in the default probability of mortgage loans, and we also 
quantified the effect of each variable. We did not focus on the relation between 
any specific variable and the probability of default. Our goal was constructing a 
model which can reliably estimate the probability of default. 
The data structure enabled us to estimate cross-sectional, binary choice models. 
We chose the survey question pertaining to repayment delinquency as our response 
variable; if the instalment of the specific loan is 90 days past due, our dependent 
variable will take the value of one, otherwise it will be zero. A delinquency of over 
90 days is customarily considered in the literature as a non-performing contract, 
4  List of all tried variables in the estimation, correlation between variables, estimation re-
sults, model’s goodness-of-fit statistics is available in an MNB occasional paper (Balás et al. 
2015) or can be obtained from the authors.
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and we followed the same practice. Having said that, due to the limitations of the 
data available, our interpretation of the probability of default (PD) differs somewhat 
from the usual concept in respect of time horizon. The estimated or projected PD 
values usually refer to becoming non-performing within a year. Since the database 
we relied on does not contain specific information about when exactly the debtor 
fell 90+ days delinquent and we performed the estimate in a cross-sectional struc-
ture, instead of PD within a year, our estimated PD values capture the probability 
of default from the disbursement of the loan to the date of sampling. Consequently, 
below we will refer to this value as long-term PD. The disadvantage of this defini-
tion is that the time elapsed since the issuance of these loans differs significantly in 
some cases (the oldest contract was made in 1978 and the youngest one in 2013). It 
is a general observation about mortgage loans that, from the perspective of becom-
ing delinquent, the first 5 years of the term are critical. Indeed, loans which remain 
performing during the first 5 years are highly unlikely to fall delinquent later. 
20% of the sample consists of contracts dated after 2008, and since not even 
the riskiest first five years have passed since then, the ratio of non-performing 
loans within this group may be smaller (with all else being equal) for this reason 
alone. Similarly, the observed default rate may be significantly lower than the 
actual value in the case of loans older than 10 years, given that for some custom-
ers who defaulted at the beginning of the loan’s maturity, even the post-default 
stage may have ended already. However, the exclusion of the pre-2004 and post-
2008 parts of the sample would entail the loss of valuable information: we would 
be forced to exclude 35% of observations, including 69% of HUF loans. Based 
on these considerations, we decided to use the entire sample as long as there are 
no major differences between estimates received for the sample limited to the 
2004–2008 period and for the total sample.
Since the sample included some households with more than one mortgage loan, 
we could have performed estimates either on contract-level or on household-level 
data. We decided to do the former for two reasons: on the one hand, contract-level 
data produced a larger sample size; on the other hand, we found some examples 
where one of the household’s loans had become 90 days past due already, while 
there were no payment problems with the other loan. This situation could not 
have been addressed properly if household-level data had been used.
0 1 2 3 4
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( * * *   
*  *   
*   
(
)
) .
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x
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We defined six variable groups, which might have significant effect on the 
probability of default: indebtedness of the household, income position of the 
household, labour market activity of the household, spending (not instalments) of 
the household, characteristics of the loan contract, and social characteristics of the 
household. There are several opportunities to measure these factors. For example, 
different ratios can grab the labour market position of the household. In many 
cases, these variables contain the same information (on PDs), but sometimes vari-
ables representing the same group can have relevant additional information com-
pared to each other. We will therefore use the following strategy: we will keep 
the most significant variable of each group, but other significant variables from 
the same group can be kept as well. Regarding the six-variable group in the case 
of “indebtedness”, our expectation was unambiguously of a positive sign, i.e. 
higher indebtedness results in a higher probability of default. Instalment (starting, 
actual, PTI, and per capita), LTV, loan size, and instalment of other loans were 
tried in this variable group. Income of the household also should be important 
since higher income has to result in a lower default probability, ceteris paribus. 
This factor was taken into consideration by two variables, namely income of the 
household and income per capita. Our expectation for the labour market activity 
of the household was similar to that in case of income. An improving situation 
on the labour market – measured by the proportion of income earners active on 
the labour market – decreases the probability of default. Rising expenditures de-
crease the amount that can be used for debt servicing, which will result in a higher 
probability of default. Characteristics of households and loan contracts can vary 
significantly, so the expected signs are unambiguous. The most important loan 
characteristics were denomination (probability of default is expected to be higher 
for FX), loan type (home equity loans perform worse), date of issuance (loans of 
2007–08 are riskier), LTV above 100 per cent (higher risks), and contracts via 
agents (higher PD is expected). Finally, the following household characteristics 
were considered: higher level of education may result in lower PD; higher PD 
was expected in the case of smaller settlement types; finally, households with 
savings were expected to be less risky.
The final version of the model presented here includes only the explanatory 
variables that proved to be significant at the 5% level. Of the binary variable 
estimation procedures, we chose the logit estimate, and in order to validate the ro-
bustness of the method, we also applied a linear probability model to the explana-
tory variables received. Based on the correlation between explanatory variables 
in the model, the existence of extreme multicollinearity can be rejected. 
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4.2. Partial effects
Ultimately, of all the listed variables, seven explanatory variables proved to be 
significant (in addition to the constant variable). Since (contrary to the linear 
probability model) partial effects differ for each observation in the case of logit 
estimates, we indicated the average partial effects customarily used in the lit-
erature. On the basis of Hosmer-Lemeshow test, we cannot rule out the model’s 
goodness of fit at either customary significance level.
Looking at the characteristics of households among the variables that proved 
to be significant, the “ratio of income earners to household members” measures 
the composition of households according to labour market activity and income 
position. According to the estimate, more income earners within the same house-
hold reduce the probability of default proportionately. This can be quantified as 
follows: if, ceteris paribus, the number of income earners increase from 2 to 3 
within a 4-member household, long-term PD will decline by 8.14 percentage 
points (on average, half of the members of a household have income).
The PTI ratio measures the burden incurred by the household in repaying the 
loan amount, the level of indebtedness. In this context, it should be noted that 
although the questions of the survey included one pertaining to the household’s 
income, in many cases no appreciable responses were received. At the same time, 
a detailed set of questions referred to households’ expenditures and savings, the 
net result of which (including, in theory, monthly instalments) captures income. 
Since the level of completion of these parts was higher, we used this artificial 
Table 3
Partial effects and significance levels of the estimated model’s variables
Variable
Average parcial effect (percentage point)
Logit Logit 2004–2008 Linear
Constant –19 24*** –29.28*** –2.19
Ratio of income earners to household 
members –8.14*** –8.53*** –7.85***
Payment-to-income (PTI) 0.76*** 0.89*** 1.26***
FX-denominated 5.70** 7.90* 2.96
Payment-to-income belonging to other loans 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.24***
Instalment per income earner 3 05*** –3.45*** –3.97***
Non-instalment expenditures 0.21** 0.25*** 0.33***
Loan via agents 5.46*** 7.53*** 5.63**
Note: * indicates variables significant at 10%, ** and *** indicate 5% and 1% significance, respectively.
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variable to approximate the income of the household concerned. Moreover, for 
the purposes of our estimate, we used the household’s actual PTI as of August 
2013 (in the lack of income data, the initial PTI value was not available). Based 
on the results, the greater a household’s debt in proportion to its income, the 
higher the long-term PD of its loan; i.e. a 1 percentage point increase in PTI will 
increase the long-term PD by 0.76 percentage points on average (with all else 
being equal). According to the estimate, the risk associated with a loan will be 
greater if the household has debt service on other loans as well. This effect is 
captured by the variable “payment-to-income ratio for other loans”. The average 
partial effect of this variable (0.24 percentage points) is smaller than that of the 
other PTI variable. This may be due to the fact that other loans also include un-
secured loans, and if a household fails to pay the debt service on its secured loan 
and on its unsecured loan at the same time, it will be inclined to fall delinquent 
with the unsecured loan. Consequently, indebtedness with unsecured loans dete-
riorates the payment discipline observed in the case of secured loans to a lesser 
degree. The ability to repay is not only influenced by instalment-type expen-
ditures. Households with higher other (non-instalment) expenditures (e.g. food, 
housing, durable and semi-durable goods, etc.) also face a higher probability of 
default. A HUF 10,000 difference in expenditures will raise the value of long-
term PD, ceteris paribus, by 0.21 percentage points on average.
The results presented so far are completely consistent with economic intuition 
in terms of their positive or negative sign. By contrast, it might be surprising that 
the variable “instalment per income earner” has a negative sign; in other words, a 
higher instalment amount will induce a lower PD value. This variable, however, 
does not capture the indebtedness of the household: according to the definition of 
the partial effect, an increase in the instalment amount, ceteris paribus, reduces 
long-term PD. Since the rest of the variables include PTI, all else can only be 
equal if the higher instalment amount is coupled with higher income. Therefore, 
instead of indebtedness, this variable is much more likely to capture income posi-
tion or, instead of the instalment amount, it measures the instalment amount that 
a household is capable of paying.5 In consideration of this, the negative sign of 
the partial effect is understandable. To confirm this view, we also estimated our 
model excluding the PTI variable. This way, the partial effect of the instalment 
per income earner became positive, i.e. it grabs the indebtedness now. 
In respect of the features of the loan, two variables proved to be significant in 
the estimate. Firstly, foreign currency loans are riskier than HUF-denominated 
5  As has been mentioned, we could only approximate the household’s income position by means 
of an artificial income variable; it must have been due to the lack of an actual income variable 
that “instalment per income earner” gained such a meaning.
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loans (owing to exchange rate driven instalment increases); specifically, foreign 
currency denomination raises long-term PD by 5.7 percentage points on average. 
In addition to the depreciation of the exchange rate, it might be the result of a uni-
lateral increase of interest rates by banks, which was very common in the case of 
FX loans. It also raised the debt service burden of loans. Secondly, compared to 
directly disbursed bank loans, the default probability of loans via agents, ceteris 
paribus, is 5.46% higher on average. Probably, riskiness of loans via agents can 
stem from the fact that agents’ relation with their customers is usually shorter 
and smaller than that of bank officials. Their motivational methods are also dif-
ferent. Therefore, the asymmetric information problem is bigger than in the case 
of other contracts. 
4.3. Robustness analysis
As we have mentioned before, in order to exclude the possible distortions stem-
ming from the different years of disbursement, we have also applied the esti-
mation on a more restricted, relatively homogeneous sample (2004–2008). The 
partial effects are completely consistent with each other on both samples in terms 
of their signs, and the same is true for the set of variables significant at the 10% 
level6. Except for the foreign currency dummy, the two models select the same 
variables even at the 5% significance level. In absolute value, the degree of aver-
age partial effects is somewhat higher for all variables in the reduced sample, but 
more noteworthy differences can be observed in the case of the two dummy vari-
ables. In the case of the FX dummy this was to be expected in any event, given 
that the instalment increases stemming from the volatility of the exchange rate 
were significantly higher for loans disbursed during this period than for those dis-
bursed later. (The estimation of FX dummy on the shorter sample is more uncer-
tain since the proportion of HUF loans was much smaller during that period). The 
level of these differences, however, did not warrant, in our opinion, the restriction 
of the sample. (We have also examined the difference between loans with differ-
ent disbursement years by using another approach, which is discussed later in the 
study, but we could not identify any significant effect in that case either.)
In order to validate the robustness of the results from the aspect of the estima-
tion procedure, we prepared an estimate with a linear probability model as well, 
which included the variables found significant by the logit models. Except for the 
FX dummy, the linear model also found all variables significant at the 5% level. 
6  To calculate the levels of significance, we applied White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent ro-
bust standard errors.
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Partial effects are completely identical in terms of their signs; as regards their 
magnitude, they exhibit more substantial differences in two cases: in the case of 
the FX dummy and the PTI. In the first case, the linear model has a lower value; 
in the second case, the model estimates a higher partial effect. Since the PTI in the 
estimate pertains to the time of the survey rather than the situation as at loan dis-
bursement (on which no information is available), the effect of the exchange rate 
depreciation is reflected in the PTI as well. Thus the PTI of FX loans is higher in 
the sample than that of HUF loans. This may account for the difference observed 
between the partial effects of the two models; in other words, in the case of FX 
loans the risk stemming from exchange rate changes is mainly reflected in the 
FX dummy in the logit model, and in the PTI in the linear model. Therefore, the 
results of the model proved to be robust from this aspect as well.
5. EXCLUDED VARIABLES
5.1. Housing loan vs. home equity loan
Several variables that should have a good explanatory power based on observa-
tions are excluded from the model. The dummy variable pertaining to the differ-
ent product types did not prove to be significant, although, based on the statistics 
on non-performing loans, there is a significant difference in terms of the per-
formance of the two product categories. While the share of non-performing loans 
within the housing loan portfolio was below 15% at the end of 2013, this rate 
approached 30% in the case of home equity loans. This difference is only partly 
explained by the fact that there are hardly any HUF-denominated loans among 
home equity loans, while HUF loans have a substantial share in housing loans. If 
we only look at FX-denominated home equity loans, the difference between NPL 
ratios is still significant: the share of NPLs in the total portfolio is 18% for hous-
ing loans and close to 30% for home equity loans.
The above difference indicates that product type may have a significant im-
pact on the probability of default. We examined why, in spite of this, the product 
dummy had no significant explanatory power in our model. We identified the 
factors which may influence the probability of default yet are markedly differ-
ent in the case of the two different products. The first such factor is the currency 
mismatch mentioned above (only 54% of all housing loans are denominated in 
foreign currency, while this ratio is above 80% in the case of home equity loans). 
This, however, does not explain the difference in the performance of foreign cur-
rency denominated loans for these two products. Looking at these two products 
separately, we find additional factors exhibiting significant differences that in-
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crease the probability of default, and we consider them, in some way, in our 
model. The first such variable is average PTI. The PTI value of housing loans is 
27%, while the same ratio was 33% for home equity loans. A higher PTI value 
increases the probability of default. The risk of debtors with home equity loans 
was also increased by having other, unsecured loans, which, in their case, was 
more typical. Being an additional burden, this reduced their ability to repay in 
and of itself. In addition, it is also important to consider that having the rescue 
package for foreign currency debtors on the agenda reduced debtors’ willingness 
to repay even further if they also had other loans, as the suspension of instal-
ments may have enabled them to repay their unsecured loans. The evolution of 
the average LTV (loan-to-value) ratio is another important characteristic of indi-
vidual loan categories. Although this variable has not been included in the model 
directly, this effect is partly reflected through the instalment amount. In the case 
of home equity loans, the average LTV value of the portfolio is 17 percentage 
points higher than that recorded for housing loans, i.e. the size of the loans was 
bigger relative to the collateral. While a higher LTV ratio is less of a decisive 
factor in Hungary for willingness to repay, it is still considered to increase risk. 
In addition, borrowers’ heterogeneous savings position also implies a difference. 
12% of housing loan borrowers have financial savings, compared to 5% of home 
equity loan borrowers.
There is a difference between the two loan categories in terms of the borrow-
ers’ labour market position as well. Although the ratio of income earners does not 
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differ for indebted households across individual products, the ratio of active earn-
ers is higher for those with housing loans. An explanation for the difference in 
PTI is that disposable income is significantly higher for housing loan borrowers 
than for home equity loan borrowers. A similar difference can be observed in re-
spect of per capita income. Per capita income is substantially higher for borrow-
ers with housing loans. In conclusion, home equity loan borrowers were, overall, 
riskier customers based on their labour market position and the relative size of 
their loans. Accordingly, these factors are included in our model as significant 
explanatory variables for non-performance.
5.2. “Vintage” effect
Besides product type, the date of disbursement should also have a significant ex-
planatory power based on intuitions. On the one hand, thanks to banks’ high risk 
tolerance – as well as consumer behaviour – a much broader range of households 
had access to loans during the time of the upsurge in FX lending and the build-up 
of the FX-denominated mortgage portfolio (2004–2008) than in the years preced-
ing or following this period. Thus, foreign currency denomination was not the only 
reason for the higher rate of loans’ non-performance during this period. On the 
other hand, some analyses on domestic retail lending pointed out that even within 
this period, there was a difference in terms of the average performance of loans: 
directly preceding the crisis, during the period between 2007 and 2008, banks 
tended to grant loans to increasingly risky customers, deteriorating the quality 
of the portfolio progressively. This is demonstrated by the chart published in the 
November 2011 issue of the Report on Financial Stability (MNB 2011) analysing 
the performance of loans issued in different years. While non-performing loans 
within loans disbursed in 2006 reached the 7.5% ratio after 5 years, this ratio was 
11% after 4 years already in the case of loans disbursed in 2007, and in the case of 
those issued in 2008, non-performing loans reached this 11% after 3 years. This 
demonstrates that loans to households have indeed become increasingly risky.
Despite all this, the dummy variable representing the different periods did not 
prove to be significant in the model prepared by us; therefore, it is worth examin-
ing the characteristics of loans issued during the different periods. Although the 
survey included loans disbursed before 2004 and after 2008 as well, we examined 
the “vintage” effect during the most intense period of household lending, the 
period between 2004 and 2008. We even split this period into two: one just pre-
ceding the crisis, the 2007–2008 period, and the period of the start of the surge: 
2004–2006. We examined the strength of the vintage effect for these two periods 
by inserting dummy variables into the total sample (one that took the value of 
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one in the case of disbursement in 2004–2006 and one for disbursement in the 
period of 2007–2008) and also by considering the restricted sample for the period 
of 2004–2008 only (and applied dummies for the period of 2007–2008 only), but 
we found that the variable(s) were not significant in either case.
Also, in this case, we examined the main characteristics of the contracts con-
cluded in the specific periods for the product breakdown. The first significant dif-
ference is that average loan size increased by more than HUF 1 million during the 
period immediately preceding the crisis compared to the previous period. There 
is no significant difference in maturities between the two periods; however, the 
slight increase observed in this case points to increased lending risks. Denomina-
tion was a possible explanation not only for the performance difference between 
the different products, but also for that between different vintages. It is clear that 
the share of foreign currency loans increased further within loans disbursed in the 
period of 2007–2008, considerably exceeding the already high 72% characteris-
ing the 2004–2006 period. We could see that the size of loans in the second period 
exceeded substantially the value characterising the first period. This information, 
in and of itself, merely suggests that the risk associated with the loans increased. 
The LTV and PTI data confirm this assumption. Both the average PTI and the av-
erage LTV values were significantly higher in the second period than in the first 
one. Finally, we also examined how typical it was to take out other, unsecured 
Chart 1. NPL ratio of FX-denominated mortgage loans disbursed in different periods
Source: MNB. 
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loans in these two groups. While there is no material difference between the two 
figures, the second period performs slightly worse in this case.
We examined whether there was a difference in the labour market situation of 
borrowers in the case of loans disbursed during the two different periods. In this 
regard, a relatively small difference was observed between the two groups, and 
the direction of the differences is not straightforward. While the ratio of active 
employees within the family is slightly higher among the borrowers of the second 
period, disposable income is smaller, both as an absolute number and as a per 
capita figure. The difference, however, is very low in both cases. Thus, labour 
market position may not be considered significantly different in the two groups. 
Finally, we have to add that the initial exchange rate may also be a difference 
between the two periods. Especially in 2008, the HUF was very strong. While the 
average HUF/CHF exchange rate for the period 2004–06 was 163, for 2007–08 
it was lower, around 155. This factor may have some influence on the difference 
between the performances of the two periods.
We can see, overall, that it was not the different labour market situation that 
meant the main difference between the loans of these two periods, but the bor-
rower’s level of indebtedness after the disbursement of the loan, which supports 
the findings of Gáspár – Varga (2011). However, as the other variables integrated 
into the model (foreign currency dummy, PTI) to capture the explored differ-
ences, it is understandable that the vintage dummy cannot be significant.
Table 5
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5.3. Other excluded variables
The exclusion of the two variables described so far required the most detailed 
presentation; however, we included some other variables in the database and test-
ed their effects during the modelling exercise, but they did not prove to be sig-
nificant. It is noteworthy to take account of them and explore the possible reasons 
for their exclusion. One of the most frequently used indicators capturing credit 
risk is the LTV ratio. The LTV expresses the size of the loan which also refers, 
implicitly, to the size of the instalment. And a high instalment amount increases 
the probability of default. In addition, a high LTV can also have a negative im-
pact on willingness to repay; indeed, if the loan is worth more than the real estate 
collateral, it may be worth letting it default. In view of this, we tried to consider 
the possible effects of the LTV in two ways: as a continuous variable, the LTV 
itself was also included in the model; in addition, we introduced a dummy vari-
able which took the value of one when the LTV rose above 100% (i.e. when the 
collateral is worth less than the borrower’s debt), otherwise it was zero. Behind 
the latter is the consideration that the deterioration of the willingness to repay 
is not necessarily in a linear relationship with changes in the LTV; it is more 
like a psychological threshold (with the obvious value of 100%) that, once it is 
reached, may deteriorate drastically. The effect stemming from the relatively high 
instalment amount is not relevant in our model because this impact mechanism 
is captured by the PTI variable far more clearly and unambiguously. The second 
problem, in our case, is also irrelevant as, on the one hand, there is no private 
bankruptcy in Hungary and, on the other hand, borrowers principally used their 
own residential property as collateral for the loans. The ratio of mortgage loans 
where the loan’s collateral was not the residential property was only 2% in the 
sample. Thus, choosing default is not a real option for borrowers.
Education often has significant explanatory power in respect of the default 
probability of loans. Nevertheless, this variable did not prove to be significant 
in our model (the reference category was elementary school education at the 
most; higher education levels were included in the model in the form of three 
dummy variables). This is because the education level, in reality, captures better 
labour market position and better income conditions. These factors, however, 
are already included, firstly in the share of income earners within the household, 
secondly by the PTI, and thirdly, by the per capita instalment amount. It can 
be explained by a similar logic that the dummy variables expressing settlement 
types (county seat, town with county rights, other towns, and smaller munici-
palities – with Budapest being the reference category) did not prove to have a 
significant explanatory power.
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Finally, participation in the exchange rate cap scheme was also excluded from 
the explanatory variables. This may have been insignificant because the exchange 
rate cap has a relatively short history in Hungary. Indeed, at the time of taking the 
survey, the scheme was hardly one year old. Usually, the restructuring of loans 
takes place because of some payment problem; however, despite the restructur-
ing, such loans are more likely to become non-performing again than problem-
free loans. Therefore, we also included a dummy for restructuring in the model, 
which eventually did not prove to be significant. This may be because loans sub-
ject to restructuring had been riskier to begin with, but this risk is already cap-
tured by the variables included in the model, thus the mere fact of restructuring 
does not carry any additional information.
6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PAYMENT-TO-INCOME RATIO 
AND CREDIT RISK
Of the explanatory variables of the model presented above it is important to 
examine the payment-to-income ratio separately. PTI is used by the regulatory 
authorities of banks in several countries (including Hungary). Regulations per-
taining to the PTI typically prescribe a limit which must not be exceeded by the 
PTI of disbursed loans. This, on the one hand, is designed to prevent borrowers 
from taking excessive burdens and, on the other hand, to limit, at least in part, the 
credit risks taken by the banking sector. At the same time, a PTI limit that is lower 
than justified restricts unnecessarily households’ access to loans and, hence, im-
pairs the efficient functioning and growth of the economy. At the beginning of 
the 2000s, several countries introduced PTI regulations in order to curb excessive 
credit expansion and prevent the build-up of systemic risks. In the known cases 
(e.g. in China, Korea, and Romania), the regulatory authorities deemed this step a 
success, although usually this was introduced as part of a bigger package, thus its 
individual effect is hard to assess (Borio et al. 2007). In the Hungarian literature, 
we can also find papers which dealt with the regulation of PTI. After analysing 
the mortgage loan portfolio, Berlinger – Walter (2013) describe “repayment bur-
den” – that is PTI – as the most important systemic risk factor. They also analyse 
the different economic factors affecting PTI (net income, exchange rate, interest 
rate). In their income contingent repayment proposal, the main objective is to 
reduce this “repayment burden” significantly and to ease systemic risk.
Therefore, it is important to examine the relationship between a loan’s long-
term PD and the borrowing household’s PTI, and to identify the PTI values which 
mark excessive risk-taking in the case of a loan. Based on our model estimates, 
we attempted to clarify this issue with the help of the data and methodology 
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available to us.7 We calculated developments in a household’s long-term PD in 
function of the PTI in the case of a foreign currency loan and in the case of a 
HUF-denominated loan. For the purposes of this exercise, we used a representa-
tive household that could be considered, based on the sample and other informa-
tion, to be average. The household was average in terms of the other variables of 
the model: it consisted of four members with two wage earners; their income was 
the same as the net average income of the national economy. The household’s 
payment-to-income ratio for other loans was 6% and it spent 75% of its total in-
come on consumption. With a probability of 22% for HUF loans and 32% for FX 
loans, their loan was intermediated. Per capita instalment amount can be derived 
from the different PTI values.
The values thus received are shown in Chart 2. The question arises as to what 
exactly is the long-term PD level that does not point to excessive risk-taking 
7  We must note, however, that there is a difference between the PTI prescribed by the authorities 
and the PTI used in our model: the regulation always pertains to the initial PTI at the time of 
loan disbursement, while in our estimate, we used the household’s actual PTI as at the time 
of the survey (as this was the only information we had). There may be a considerable differ-
ence between the two due to changes in the exchange rate, interest rate, and income. In our 
opinion, however, this does not have a material distorting effect on the results presented.
Chart 2. Long-term PD in the function of the PTI with different denominations and income
Source: The survey.
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(assuming the natural functioning of the banking system). In our sample, the 
total loan portfolio comprises 10 currently non-performing loans in the case of 
housing loans, while non-performing loans account for 17% of the portfolio in 
the case of home equity loans. This observation, however, pertains to a period 
that was characterised by higher than desirable lending risks and the excessive 
indebtedness of borrowers (which is reflected, even in our days, in soaring and 
historically high banking sector NPL rates and the payment burdens of foreign 
currency debtors). Thus, the desirable PD value is lower than this.
In order to determine this value more precisely, we performed a calculation 
based on simple rules of thumb. The high NPL rate (around 20%) currently char-
acterising mortgage loans was induced by high probabilities of default, the de-
clining loan portfolio, and the low portfolio cleaning rates. From a simple calcu-
lation, we can deduce that, in the context of the assumptions of a normal business 
cycle, the current banking sector NPL ratio would be about 5–6% in the case of 
mortgage loans. For the purposes of the calculation, we considered a 10-year pe-
riod where the loan portfolio grows by 5.5% annually (corresponding to the rate 
of nominal GDP growth in case of 2.5% real growth and a 3% inflation rate), the 
probability of default (i.e. the customary PD) is 1.5% and the quarterly cleaning 
rate is 5%. As a result of this calculation, the NPL ratio would be around 5.5% 
after 10 years, implying a risk of manageable size for the banking sector. This 
view is supported by several factors.
We have checked the household NPL ratio for the last few years in the other 
Visegrád countries, which were performing much better than Hungary. The aver-
age level was around 5.6% (Chart 3). Note that the NPL ratio of state subsidised 
HUF mortgages was around 4.5–5% during the crisis, which confirms our view 
that this is a tolerable level. The faster growth of the loan stock or better clean-
ing activity may result in a lower ratio, but our goal was finding an acceptable 
maximum level.
It is due to the specificities of the sample that we could not consider cleaning, 
irrespective of how long the specific loan has been delinquent. Moreover, in our 
sample we could not reckon with a growth of the portfolio either. Considering 
all these factors, the tolerable NPL ratio would be about 10–11% within the port-
folio (mainly due to the lack of cleaning).8 The latter shows how big the actual 
non-performance ratio would have been in our sample in the context of normal 
risk appetite and with all other conditions being unchanged. Since this is the 
realised value of the PD definition used for our estimate in the sample average, 
for the rest of our study we consider this 10% long-term PD to be the risk taking 
8  Indeed, our sample implicitly assumes that there is no cleaning.
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that is still tolerable for the regulator (this 10% long-term PD level is highlighted 
in Chart 2).
When HUF- and FX-denominated loans are compared to one another, the two 
loan categories may be considered to have identical risk (in terms of non-per-
formance) in the context of extremely different PTI values. In the case of HUF 
loans, a 38% PTI, while in the case of FX loans, a 24% PTI is consistent with the 
aforementioned 10% long-term PD value. Therefore, during the review period, 
an average household’s indebtedness in foreign currency increased long-term PD 
to a degree corresponding to a 14% increase in PTI. This difference can be con-
sidered significant even if we know that some of it can be explained by unilateral 
interest rate hike.
In addition to currency denomination, we also examined the relationship be-
tween the probability of default and the payment-to-income ratio in function of the 
household’s income. As households’ income increases, they typically spend less 
and less on consumption: while the consumption rate is often 100% in the case of 
low-income households, households with higher income can accumulate substan-
tial savings. Thus, an increase in income also increases the PTI that can be toler-
ated by the household. Chart 2 indicates how long-term PD changes in function of 
the PTI if the household’s income is twice the amount of the net average income. 
Chart 3. NPL ratio in the region during the crisis
Source: ECB. 
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Table 6 sums up the PTI values belonging to the 10% long-term PD and various 
household income brackets. Accordingly, in the case of a household with a HUF 
loan and an average income, even a 20% higher PTI would not imply excessive 
indebtedness if the household’s income was doubled. While in the case of foreign 
currency loans this value is smaller – 10% –, it can still be considered high.
Our sample is heterogeneous on the start of the contract (and for this reason, on 
macroeconomic and regulatory conditions as well); we have made these calcula-
tions for the period of 2004–2008 (among the robustness tests we have shown this 
model as well and it could be also seen that the two models were very similar). 
Table 7 summarises the results. Comparing these numbers with the results in Ta-
ble 6, it is clear that there is no significant difference in the case of FX loans. Re-
garding HUF loans, we got higher PTIs for the shorter sample by 7–9 percentage 
points. Since most of the FX loans (83%) were issued in the period 2004–2008, 
getting similar results for the two models is not surprising. In the case of HUF 
loans, only 36% of the sample was in the shorter period, so we lose a lot of infor-
mation on them in this model. In the case of HUF loans, we think that the model 
gives better results on the whole sample.
Our results carry an important message from a regulatory perspective: pre-
scribing the same PTI for HUF and FX loans may be unnecessarily restrictive 
for the former, and excessively permissive for the latter. A similar conclusion 
can be drawn about the uniform regulations pertaining to households in different 
income brackets. It would be therefore reasonable to introduce a distinction and 
Table 6
PTI values belonging to the 10% long-term PD of an average household in the context of different 
incomes and denominations (total loans)
per cent 100,000 HUF 150,000 HUF 200,000 HUF 250,000 HUF 300,000 HUF
HUF 34 38 42 49 59
FX 22 24 26 30 35
Source: The survey.
Table 7
PTI values belonging to the 10% long-term PD of an average household in the context 
of different incomes and denominations (2004–2008)
per cent 100,000 HUF 150,000 HUF 200,000 HUF 250,000 HUF 300,000 HUF
HUF 41 45 51 58 69
FX 22 24 26 30 35
Source: The survey.
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apply different PTI limits for different denominations and income levels. Obvi-
ously, the values indicated above imply desirable average levels over the long 
term. When the economy and the credit market show signs of overheating, there 
is a higher risk of overly permissive regulations, while during a recession and in 
the context of a credit crunch, the risk of excessively stringent PTI regulations 
is higher. Accordingly, the regulator should also consider developments in the 
economic and lending cycle, and also the interest rate dynamics.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We estimated the probability of default of Hungarian households with the help of 
a representative questionnaire-based survey. The data structure enabled us to use 
cross-sectional, binary choice models. We used the survey question pertaining to 
repayment delinquency as our response variable and considered the specific loan 
non-performing if the instalment was 90 days past due. In the model received as 
the final specification, the signs and magnitude of the variables were consistent 
with economic intuitions. The results proved to be robust to model specification, 
i.e., whether to include vintage effects and non-linearity.
Of the features that purely characterise households, only one variable proved 
to be significant: the “ratio of income earners to total household members”, which 
captures the household’s labour market activity and its composition according to 
income position. According to the estimate, more income earners within the same 
household reduce the probability of default proportionately.
As regards the features of the loan, two variables proved to be significant in 
the estimate. Firstly, foreign currency loans are riskier than HUF loans, secondly, 
compared to directly disbursed bank loans, the default probability of loans via 
agents is higher.
As regards the rest of the indicators, four factors proved to have significant 
explanatory power. The PTI level measures the burden incurred by the household 
in repaying the loan amount, the level of indebtedness. The higher a household’s 
indebtedness in proportion to its income (PTI), the higher the long-term PD of 
its loan. According to the estimate, the risk associated with a loan will be also 
greater if the household has debt service on other loans as well. This effect is 
captured by the variable “payment-to-income ratio for other loans”. The ability 
to repay is not only influenced by instalments. Households with a higher level 
of “expenditures above the instalment amount” also face a higher probability of 
default. Finally, “per capita instalment amount” proved to be significant as well; 
however, the sign of the variable is negative. This means that a higher instal-
ment amount induces lower long-term PD. Instead of indebtedness, this variable 
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primarily captures income position and, in line with this, instead of the instalment 
amount it measures the instalment amount that a household is capable of paying. 
In consideration of this, the negative sign of the partial effect is understandable.
During our estimates, we have also tested several variables which were not 
included in the final model (due to their insignificant effect), even though they 
may have considerable explanatory power based on empirical experiences. We 
demonstrated, however, that the effects reflected in them are captured by other 
indicators that proved to be significant in our model. For instance, distinguishing 
on the basis of loan purpose, we can establish that home equity loans perform 
worse than housing loans. This, however, is due to the fact that households with 
home equity loans are more indebted with worse income and labour market posi-
tions. The situation is similar when we compare loans disbursed in the periods 
of 2004–2006 and 2007–2008: debtors’ higher indebtedness explains the higher 
non-performance rate of loans disbursed during the latter period.
Based on the model estimated, we examined the relationship between PTI and 
the probability of default in the case of different loan denominations and different 
household incomes. The results carry two important messages from a regulatory 
perspective. Prescribing the same PTI for HUF and FX loans may be unnecessar-
ily restrictive for the former, and excessively permissive for the latter. Similarly, 
the uniform regulation of households with different income levels may also lead 
to undesired anomalies. In order to avoid this, a potential new PTI regulation 
should differentiate between loans based on denomination and between house-
holds based on income levels.
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